Pain as a Gestalt
You know the duck/rabbit phenomenon, where a drawing
sometimes looks like a duck and sometimes like a rabbit, but never the two at
once. This is known as a Gestalt shift, since the whole form (Gestalt) of the drawing
changes from one (duck) to the other (rabbit), and each form is in some sense
“greater than the sum of its parts,” which are the original lines and curves
and their arrangement on the page, which constitute neither the image of a duck
nor a rabbit but are ambiguous or just themselves.
Another
well-known example of Gestalt shift is the Necker cube, another drawing which
presents itself to our vision in only one or the other of two distinct aspects
– in this case, both times as a cube (and so again not merely the lines or
their arrangement on the paper), but with front and back reversed.
Well, the
other day I was out for a walk. Of late I have been suffering from tendinitis,
and so I am used to feeling pain at the back of my left foot with each step. But
all of a sudden I noticed that the pain was gone. And yet, paradoxically, the
feeling had not changed. At least, that is how I was compelled to describe the
situation to myself.
I know of
other situations that are similar, where we might be tempted to say that we still
feel pain but have ceased to suffer. (My late mentor Jerome Shaffer wrote about
this distinction.) The wriggling of a loose tooth could be an example of this;
being sedated during a medical procedure another. Masochism would be an extreme
case. But what I was feeling on my walk seemed more definitely to be the
disappearance of the pain itself. And yet, as I say, I was still feeling
something, and the feeling struck me as indistinguishable from what a moment
before I had experienced as pain.
This leads
me to an extraordinary hypothesis. Could pain be a Gestalt? And more
specifically, could pain be liable to Gestalt shift? In other words, just as we
can learn to adjust our vision to see whichever of the duck or rabbit we want
to, or whichever orientation of the Necker cube we want to, might we be able to
learn how to switch off a pain by experiencing it as a nonpainful sensation?
I claim no
more for this than its being, as I called it, an hypothesis. It is subject to
further testing, but each of us can perform these experiments. I do in fact
know someone who claims to be able to sit calmly through her dental
appointments without anesthetic; I wonder if something like this is going on
there. But in my tendinitis case, it is quite possible the pain had simply gone
away, and my phenomenology (the way the event felt to me) was simply mistaken
as an analysis of what was actually going on.
If, however, the hypothesis has some merit, then it implies that the correct analysis of, say, tendinitis pain is that there are really three phenomena intimately linked, because both the pain and the nonpainful feeling would be aspects of a third thing, analogous to the lines on the page of the Gestalt drawings. So in neither case would I have been feeling what was “really there” – some yet more primitive sensation, or perhaps only purely physical tissue damage.